Altria Group

Altria Group, formerly Philip Morris, is the world's largest tobacco company. In the U.S. it controls about half of the tobacco market. In 2007, Altria spun off its food division. Altria Group's primary holdings until 2007 included Philip Morris companies as well as Kraft Foods (Jell-O, Kool-Aid, Maxwell House), which it spun off in 2007. Philip Morris International is an international tobacco company that has seven of the top 20 global cigarette brands. See also History of Philip Morris. In 2010, it had a total revenue of $16.9 billion. Its CEO, Michael Szymancyk, had an annual compensation of $24.1 million in 2010. For more on annual revenue, see below.

Support for the American Legislative Exchange Council
Altria is a member of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Daniel Smith, Western Regional Director of Altria Client Services, represents Altria on the corporate ("Private Enterprise") board as of 2011. Toby Spangler, a lobbyist with Altria Client Services, represented the global corporation on ALEC's corporate board in 2011.


 * Related Sourcewatch resources: ALEC and Tobacco

Products
Altria brand names include cigarette brands Marlboro, Basic, Chesterfield, Lark, L&M, Parliament and Virginia Slims. Altria Corporate Services used to be known as Philip Morris Management Corporation. It provides services, including legal services, to all Altria group entities.

Conviction in U.S. Racketeering Lawsuit
On September 22, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a racketeering lawsuit against Philip Morris (now a division of Altria) and other major cigarette manufacturers. Almost 7 years later, on August 17, 2006 U.S. District Court Judge Gladys Kessler found that the Government had proven its case and that the tobacco company defendants had violated the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Specifically, Judge Kessler found that PM and other tobacco companies had:


 * conspired to minimize, distort and confuse the public about the health hazards of smoking;
 * concealed and suppressed research data showing nicotine is addictive;
 * denied that they can and do control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes to keep smokers addicted;
 * marketed "light" and "low tar" brands to mislead people about their relative harmfulness compared to "full flavored" cigarettes;
 * purposely marketed to young people under 21 to recruit "replacement smokers" and preserve the industry's financial future;
 * publicly denied, while internally acknowledging, that secondhand tobacco smoke is harmful to nonsmokers, and
 * destroyed documents relevant to litigation

Racketeering Conviction Upheld on Appeal
On May 22, 2009, a three-judge panel of the Washington, D.C. U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the lower court's 2006 ruling that the cigarette makers had systematically lied to the public in a 50-year conspiracy to defraud the public about the health hazards of smoking. The Court also agreed that tobacco companies must publish "corrective statements" on the adverse health effects and addictiveness of smoking and nicotine, and stop using misleading labels like "low tar," "light," "ultra light" or "mild," since such cigarettes are now known to be no safer than others, because of the way people smoke them. The court said that tobacco companies "knew about the negative health consequences of smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of nicotine, the harmfulness of secondhand smoke, and the concept of smoker compensation, which makes light cigarettes no less harmful than regular cigarettes and possibly more."

"Light" Cigarettes Lawsuits
On December 15, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court threw out a $10.1 billion verdict against Philip Morris and its parent company, Altria Group, saying they did not mislead consumers when advertising "light" cigarettes.

The Chicago Tribune reports that Philip Morris' lawyers "contributed $16,800 to help elect a judge who cast a deciding vote" in the case. Judge Lloyd Karmeier "also received $1.2 million in campaign money from a group that filed an amicus brief supporting the cigarette-maker." The Illinois Chamber of Commerce, "which also filed an amicus brief in support of Philip Morris, contributed $269,338" to Karmeier's campaign. Yet Karmeier did not recuse himself. The court's press secretary said Karmeier "has tried to insulate himself from knowing the identities of campaign contributors and would not allow campaign contributions to have any effect on his ruling in this or any other case."

On December 15, 2008 the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling in a case against Philip Morris, gave a green light to smokers to sue tobacco companies over the fraudulent marketing of "light," "ultralight" and "low tar" cigarettes. Cigarette companies at the time were facing around 40 such lawsuits. For decades, advertising lulled smokers into believing that so-called "light" and "low tar" cigarettes were better for their health. Smokers in Maine, however, sued Philip Morris, charging that the company violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by fraudulently advertising that their “light” cigarettes delivered lower levels of tar and nicotine than regular brands. They also said that PM had been aware for decades that smokers compensate for lower levels of tar and nicotine by taking longer and deeper puffs. Philip Morris argued that the Federal Trade Commission's endorsement of machine testing for tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes, started in the 1960s, should relieve them of fraud charges. The FTC recently abandoned its testing method, though, after concluding that it is flawed because machines don't take into account how smokers adjust their smoking behavior when using cigarettes with lower levels of nicotine.


 * Related Sourcewatch resource: Moral Issue on FTC Tar

Name Change to Altria: Escape from Tobacco
On Thursday, November 15, 2001 Philip Morris Companies, Inc. issued a press release saying the company intended to ask its shareholders to approve a change of the company's name to Altria Group, Inc. Philip Morris Companies operates Miller Brewing, Kraft General Foods, Bird's Eye, Louis Rich and other well-known food subsidiaries in addition to manufacturing cigarettes. PM Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Geoffrey C. Bible, said he proposed the name change for two reasons: "a need for clarity," and "the evolution of Philip Morris Companies Inc." However, a corporate marketing strategy document was written by Landor Associates (a market positioning strategy consulting firm) for Philip Morris (PM) in December, 1993 by an "identity consultant" as part of PM's "Identity Development Program" provides early evidence that PM was attempting to escape the stigma of selling tobacco products by attempting to "re-position" its image in consumers' minds. The document concludes that the key to escaping the damaging association with tobacco was changing the name of the company.

According to Landor Associates, chief among the problems caused by PM's close identification with cigarettes were the following:
 * "As awareness of tobacco issues increase, Philip Morris increasingly reacts/defends."
 * "As 'tobacco' image of Philip Morris increases, market value of Philip Morris decreases."

The document also describes PM's "Future Business Focus" as "Away from declining, high risk, tobacco business" and towards the image of a "premier brand management company." According to the plan, the re-positioned company should be "Not tobacco related" and have "no negative connotations."

Interestingly, the first "target audience" Landor listed for the corporate "re-positioning" was its employees, indicating that PM's employee morale was suffering, possibly from the stigma of working for a tobacco company.

On January 27, 2003 Philip Morris (PM) officially completed the change of its corporate name to "Altria Group." PM claimed publicly that there were two reasons for the change, the same reasons CEO Geoffrey Bible had stated earlier. One was to avoid public "confusion" between its two branches (the domestic company Philip Morris USA and Philip Morris International, which sells cigarettes outside the U.S.), and the other was "to reflect the evolution of our enterprise and to set a platform for more evolution in the future." Privately, however, the name change was done for quite different reasons.

PM had contemplated changing it name for at least ten years. An untitled 1993 Philip Morris (PM) document reports on an internal corporate meeting held from December 6-8, 1993 at a conference resort in Virginia to "further the proposed repositioning of Philip Morris Co." The meeting was attended by key PM executives, senior representatives of PM corporate headquarters and PM's public relations company, Burson-Marsteller. The purpose of the meeting was to address a slump in employee morale and the company's sagging credibility in general. It says that the company had to get away from being perceived as "just" a tobacco company. At this meeting, PM executives attempted to define what to do. The repositioning sought to extract specific behaviors from downtrodden PM employees: "Engaging in good word-of-mouth about the company, selling us both inside and outside the organization, actively investing in the organization," (which suggests that perhaps PM employees at the time were not engaging in these desired behaviors to a satisfactory extent). Another goal of PM's repositioning was to boost the company's credibility among policy makers, universities and medical centers, who at the time were becoming reluctant to associate with PM. The report says a goal of the repositioning was to encourage "key universities and medical foundations to invest in NewCo..." (NewCo being the hypothetical new name of the company). It predicted that as a result of the name change, "[in 3-5 years we will be] able to secure endorsements from organizations who do not endorse us today." PM also wanted its institutional investors to "no longer [see] us as a tobacco company..." and to "see us as more than a tobacco company; as a company with a bright future and relatively low risk." Perhaps most indicative of the attitudes (and egos) of Philip Morris executives at the time is the brainstorming session near the end of the document, "Ideas for Launching NewCo." The list includes ideas like: ...and starting an international homeless program. Near the end of the list, it was suggested that these actions "Could tie to possible homeless charity contribution." This brings to mind Philip Morris' efforts to boost its corporate image by widely promoting its philanthropic donations.
 * Buy out the Superbowl
 * Involve Howard Stern
 * Build empty stadium...Fill stadium with Jell-O
 * Own the Olympics
 * Involve Rush Limbaugh
 * Sponsor rave parties

Concerns listed near the end of the document include that the repositioning "Could make the company look desperate," and that "Repositioning could hurt food [units] as it is formally linked to tobacco under NewCo."

Re-naming the company was clearly linked to boosting investor confidence, credibility and employee morale, and to diffusing attacks from "pressure groups" who, according to the document, after the repositioning would be instructed to "address themselves to our business units--not NewCo."

The real reasons for the name change were further confirmed in a November 30, 2001 Philip Morris internal email between executives that suggests that the company's name change from "Philip Morris" to "Altria" is to divert attention away from the company's ties to tobacco and pull attention toward an image of "compliance, responsibility, philanthropy, environment...all the things we want Altria to be identified with. The email was written by James Spector, Vice President of Corporate Affairs at PM, and was sent to Thomas Collamore, Vice President of Public Affairs at PM, and Steve Parrish, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for PM USA. Spector wrote:

"I know we have shied away from setting a revised purpose/role for the Altria Group, but in the current environment this seems like a perfect time for us to define the 'new' Corporation the way we want to... While on the face of it, it is just a name change, we also have the opportunity to highlight many of the initiatives that were already in place under PMCos Inc., but were unable to breakthrough because of the name confusion. We can begin to focus attention away from tobacco, and on to compliance, responsibility, philanthropy, environment, etc., all the things we want Altria to be identified with..."

Philip Morris Corporate Affairs Department
Philip Morris Corporate Affairs Department is the single department most responsible for implementing a vast number of strategies, tactics and programs over the decades to undermine public health efforts to reduce smoking. Under PM's Vice President of Corporate Affairs Ellen Merlo, the department was responsible for the formation of the smokers rights front group the National Smokers Alliance, a fake "grassroots" group set up to protest public smoking laws, cigarette tax increases and other public health measures. Corporate Affairs was also responsible for implementing PM's Accommodation Program.

A December 1993 PM Corporate Affairs Department presentation describes PM strategies to defeat smoking bans and excise taxes across the U.S. Strategies include encouraging tighter restrictions on the operation of nonprofit health organizations (for example, restricting how much of these groups' income could go to administrative and lobbying costs, and creating minimum percentages of funding that they would be mandated to put towards research). Other goals were the strategic use of PM's "Accommodation Program" as a "tactical weapon" to support preemptive state legislation. A quote from page 80 of the presentation PM recounts the company's reasons for opposing bans:

"If smokers can't smoke on the way to work, at work, in stores, banks, restaurants, malls and other public places, they are going to smoke less. A large percentage of them are going to quit. In short, cigarette purchases will be drastically reduced and volume declines will accelerate."

Corporate Affairs was also in charge of coordinating with other tobacco companies to interfere in legislated efforts to enact smoking laws. It was in charge of setting up phone banks and pressuring employees of PM as well as employees of its food and drink subsidiaries, like Kraft and Miller Beer, to make calls and write letters to policymakers opposing smoking laws.

On August 2, 1988, the Wall Street Journal reported that Philip Morris spent $10,000 to bring 40 smokers to a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia to form an early smokers rights group called the American Smokers Alliance (ASA). The Journal reported that PM had paid the participants’ round trip air fare, hotel rooms and some meals, and that Guy L. Smith, Vice President of Philip Morris Corporate Affairs, spoke at the meeting and hinted that the ASA could get more funding from PM if ASA got more members to join. ,

Arguments Against Smoking Restrictions
Internal Philip Morris documents show PM has made highly organized efforts to advance the following strategies and arguments to fight smoking restrictions:


 * Slippery Slope ("Shift concern over ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] to slippery slope argumentation and/or tolerance");


 * Liken secondhand smoke to perceived risks from other items of public concern, like cellular phones, chlorinated water ("identifying other risk parallels (EMFs, cellular phones, chlorinated water)";


 * "Shift concern over ETS in the workplace from the health issue to one of annoyance."


 * "Shift the concern over ETS in restaurants from bans to accommodation where bans are imminent."


 * "Develop an 'ETS Task Force,' with global PM representation to develop strategies to combat smoking restrictions."


 * "...package comprehensive improvements in ventilation to forestall tobacco specific bans and source control, shifting the debate from ETS to IAQ [indoor air quality]."

Pursuit of FDA Regulation of Tobacco
Realizing that the eventual regulation of cigarettes was inevitable, in 1999 PM started an internal project to enact Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations on its own terms. The plan was called the Regulatory Strategy Project. The goal was to enact FDA regulations according to 5 core principles that would assure the company retained a measure of control over advertising and marketing, and assure a future market for cigarettes. The core principles, if achieved, would have the effect of safeguarding the company's ability to market cigarettes with a minimum of restrictions, transfer responsibility for fully informing the public about the dangers of tobacco use onto the FDA and take it off the manufacturers, and transfer legal liability for the safety of tobacco products onto the FDA, while allowing cigarette companies the ability to continue to design and market cigarettes as they see fit.

A 2001 PM strategy memo shows that pursuit of FDA regulations would help complicate tobacco issues for the public (a positive for PM, since it would blur the "black and white" divisions between public health and tobacco companies) and provide a positive public relations benefit for PM. The memo states,

"Unfortunately for the industry, the tobacco debate in recent years suffered from oversimplification, perpetuated by media coverage that depicts tobacco-related issues as 'black and white,' with tobacco companies playing the predictable role as evil corporate giant..."

It continues, "The debate over FDA reform has the potential to complicate this portrayal in a manner that will specifically benefit Philip Morris. The simple fact that other tobacco companies will likely come out on the opposite side of the issue -- against FDA regulation -- provides Philip Morris a chance to distinguish itself from its competitors as a good corporate citizen. Positioned appropriately, the campaign can actually serve two purposes: achieving Philip Morris's goal of instituting regulation of the tobacco industry while also realizing significant public affairs benefits."

Puffing Wikipedia
In January 2005 someone on a computer mapping to the New York office of PM edited the Wikipedia article on Marlboro cigarettes. The edit deleted the statement that Marlboro "emerged as the number one youth-initiation brand." 

The attempt at puffing Wikipedia worked until the original statement was reinstated on August 26, 2007. While the statement remains unreferenced, the evidence supports its inclusion for the U.S. In its Youth Tobacco Surveillance from 1998-1999 report, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control state that "young people have strong cigarette brand preferences. Almost half of current smokers in both middle school and high school report that they usually smoke Marlboro cigarettes." The rest of the youth market was split between several other brands.

Animal Studies on Tobacco Products
On April 28, 2005, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) presented a shareholder resolution for Altria to cease animal testing for tobacco products, claiming ownership of 114 shares of common stock. PETA pointed out that animals respond very differently from humans to exposure to tobacco smoke. After decades of testing, they do not develop lung cancer; even when hooked up around-the-clock to smoke ventilation machines. Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom have placed limits or bans on the testing of tobacco products on animals. A PETA representative attended Altria´s annual meeting in East Hanover, New Jersey to present the resolution, which failed to pass.

Covance Laboratories & Altria Group
Altria is a client of Covance Laboratories. Covance is an international contract research organization (CRO) and laboratory animal breeding company. Firms hire CROs to conduct animal toxicity tests for agrochemicals, petrochemicals, household products, pharmaceutical drugs and toxins. Covance is the largest importer of primates in the United States and the world's largest breeder of laboratory dogs. Under its former name of Hazleton Laboratories, Covance provided animal data favorable to the tobacco industry and contributed to the continued marketing of cigarettes. In the 1990s, Covance performed studies sponsored by the tobacco industry claiming that even extreme exposure to secondhand smoke was safe for humans. Covance internal documents from 2002 discuss a Philip Morris/Covance Project Team for studies. At a November 2005 tobacco trade-group conference in Manila, Philippines, Covance's presentation was entitled: How Can Covance Support Research and Development Needs of the Tobacco Industry? Covance has amassed a history of gross animal welfare violations in the United States and Europe. See also Covance Laboratories.

Quotable
On December 6, 1993, the New York Times quoted sworn testimony of William Campbell, then President and CEO of Phillip Morris:


 * "A. To my knowledge, it has not been proven that cigarette smoking causes cancer.
 * Q. What do you base that on?
 * A. I base that on the fact that traditionally, there is, you know, in scientific terms, there are hurdles related to causation, and at this time there is no evidence that -- they have not been able to reproduce cancer in animals from cigarette smoking." ,

Political contributions
In 2010, Open Secrets reports Altria Group's PAC spent almost $2 million on political contributions to federal candidates. Federal House Democrats received $235,000 and Republican $448,350. Senate Democrats received $32,000 and Republicans $132,500.

The Altria political action committee (PAC) gave $986,500 to federal candidates in the 05/06 election cycle - 34% to Democrats, 66% to Republicans.

Lobbying
In the first half of 2011, Altria Group has spent almost $3 million on lobbying as reported by Open Secrets.

Altria Group spent $10.4 million on lobbying in 2010. You can see an entire list of their lobbying firms and lobbyists HERE. There is also a list of the bills they sponsored HERE.

The company spent $12,870,000 for lobbying in 2006. $4,010,000 of this total went to 24 outside lobbying firms, some of which included Lesher & Russell, Winston & Strawn, and Arnold & Porter.

Annual Revenue
2010 Total Revenues: $16.9 billion Gross Profit: $9 billion Net Income: $3.2 billion

2009 Total Revenues: $16.8 billion Gross Profit: $9.3 billion Net Income: $3.9 billion

2008 Total Revenues: $15.95 billion Gross Profit: $7.8 billion Net Income: $3 billion

2007 Total Revenues: $15.2 billion Gross Profit: $7.4 billion Net Income: $9.8 billion

Smears
A 1985 document found in the area of Cathy Lynn Ellis of Philip Morris shows PM's top management contemplated using smear tactics to deter the most effective public health advocates. A quote from the document targets John F. Banzhaf, III, the attorney who successfully applied the Fairness Doctrine to get the first anti-smoking ads on TV in the late 1960s. In exploring ways to chill the zeal of tobacco control advocates, the document states:

"'Possibly, too, we can discredit our critics. John Banzhaf for example, is alleged to be involved in the porno industry. Can't we use this somehow?  If we start to dig around, we will certainly find anomalies which we can exploit...'"

Another idea was to commission the writing of a book on the "anti-industry industry" to show the public how much money tobacco control advocates are making off their pursuits. Yet another line says that PM must "work to establish a mind-set in the public at large that bankrupting huge industries such as tobacco in unthinkable ... It just has to be possible to demonstrate that large industries cannot be made to disappear without extremely grave consequences ..."

Food
One way Philip Morris (PM) curries favor among legislators is by inviting them to lavishly catered parties in nice places. A 1990 billing document shows such lobbying activity in the state of Colorado. It is an invoice from the Epicurean Catering company to Philip Morris Government Affairs office for a catered party given on Sunday, October 31, 1999 in a Penthouse Suite at Mile High Stadium during a Denver Broncos football game. Handwriting on the invoice shows that the party was attended by key Colorado legislators, as well as PM lobbyists and members of PM's legal department. The menu included spiced Jumbo shrimp, smoked baby back ribs, herb-crusted beef tenderloin, scalloped potatoes, Caesar salad, Haagen Dazs ice cream bars, mini cheesecakes and full bar service. One of the Colorado legislators who attended the party was State Senator Norma Anderson, who in the 1999/2000 legislative season introduced Colorado's bill to divvy up the Master Settlement Agreement funds. Senator Anderson's bill called for a level of funding for tobacco prevention that (at 15%) was far below the amount recommended by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control for each state (25%). Sen. Anderson's bill determined that most of the rest of the settlement funds be diverted to non-tobacco-related-programs such as a reading program for elementary school-aged children, the Veteran's Fund, nursing programs, and other non-tobacco-related causes. Similar invoices available among the documents show that Philip Morris holds such parties in Colorado fairly regularly and easily spends $3,000-$4,000 for food alone on each occasion.

Undermining legislation

 * Philip Morris Undermining public interest legislation
 * Donohoe MT, Cigarettes: The other weapons of mass destruction Medscape Ob/Gyn and Women’s Health 2005;10(1): posted 4/5/05. This article discusses efforts by Big Tobacco and the US government to scuttle the Global Tobacco Treaty. An open-access powerpoint is available at Slide show covering US attempts to scuttle Global Tobacco Treaty, with comments on the links between medical schools, the insurance industry, and the tobacco industry. No password necessary.

Circumventing bans on cigarette ads in other countries
A 1986 Philip Morris (PM) marketing presentation about Saudi Arabia describes methods that PM uses to circumvent a total ban on cigarette advertising in Saudi Arabia. The writer begins by saying, "Saudi Arabia provides a striking example of how it is possible to grow volume, market share and income in a market where advertising is completely banned...."

PM used "creative approaches" to get around the ad ban, including strategies such as placing advertisements in "local journals from Pan Arab publications which find their way into Saudi Arabia." PM also "develop[ed] sponsorships in neighboring markets which provide good opportunities for promotion and publicity on TV." PM also teamed with car companies to sponsor motor sports in the Gulf, because "events such as these are widely televised ... Saudi networks cover some directly while neighboring countries cover others." PM also sought to "profit from the Arab interest in motor sports by exhibiting a simulator of a Formula One Marlboro car at this year's motor show in Jeddah. This attracted large crowds."

The writer also explains that, "Since both Arabic, mainly Kuwaiti and English foreign language press do get into Saudi, we use these to promote Marlboro and other brands ... " PM also says, "We've also been using cross-border television advertising in a joint program with Canon cameras. These carry shots of Marlboro Formula One cars intermingled with the main advertisement, Canon cameras."

PM made an agreement with a private home video distribution company to promote Marlboro by putting commercials on video cassette movies for home rental "to advertise the distributors extensive library of 'Westerns'." In the same report, PM describes its vigorous fight against the Gulf Council Health Ministry's attempts to require bigger warning labels on cigarettes, as well as a proposal to restrict the nicotine content of cigarettes. The report also documents a huge increase in cigarette exports from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia by PM alone between 1975 and 1985. PM says that in 1975, the company exported three-quarters of one billion cigarettes to Saudi Arabia. By 1985 that number had jumped to fifteen billion "units" (cigarettes).

PM Projects and Operations

 * Guest Choice Network, now the Center for Consumer Freedom
 * Philip Morris' Ninja Program (Recruiting "average joe" media spokespersons)
 * Philip Morris' Operation Downunder (Strategy for dealing with secondhand smoke issue)
 * Philip Morris'Accommodation Program (to compel the creation of smoking areas in public places)
 * Philip Morris'Project Sunrise (Subverting tobacco control)
 * Philip Morris'Project Rainbow (Bargaining strategy with government if faced with potentially stricter regulations)
 * Philip Morris'Archetype Project (How to market to youth)
 * Project Brass (Secondhand smoke strategy project)
 * Places Program (Secondhand smoke strategy project)
 * Philip Morris External Research Program
 * Philip Morris' Whitecoat Project (Recruiting scientific consultants to spin secondhand smoke issues)
 * Philip Morris' Latin Project (Scientific consultants program in Latin America)
 * The Asian environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consultants programme

Executive Compensation
2011


 * Michael E. Szymanczyk - Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of Executive Committee and Chairman of Philip Morris USA Inc: $24.1 million
 * Howard A. Willard - CFO and Executive Vice President of Altria Group Inc. - ?
 * William F. Gifford Jr. - CEO of Philip Morris USA and President of Philip Morris USA, Altria Group Inc. - ?
 * John J. Mulligan - CEO of Philip Morris Capital Corporation and President of Philip Morris Capital Corporation, Altria Group Inc. - ?

Personnel
2011


 * Michael E. Szymanczyk: Chairman, CEO, Chairman of Executive Committee and Chairman of Philip Morris USA Inc.
 * David Greenberg, Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer
 * Howard A Willard: CFO and Executive Vice President
 * Theodor P. Baseler: CEO of Ste Michelle Wine Estates Ltd. and President of Ste Michelle Wine Estates Ltd.
 * William F. Gifford Jr.: CEO of Philip Morris USA and President of Philip Morris USA
 * John J. Mulligan: CEO of Philip Morris Capital Corporation and President of Philip Morris Capital Corporation
 * Peter P. Paoli: CEO of US Smokeless Tobacco and President of US Smokeless Tobacco
 * Craig G. Schwartz: CEO of John Middleton Co. and President of John Middleton Co.
 * Martin J. Barrington: Vice Chairman, Chief Compliance & Administrative Officer and Executive Vice President
 * Murray R. Garnick: Senior Vice President of Litigation of Altria Client Services Inc. and Associate General Counsel of Altria Client Services Inc.
 * Craig A. Johnson: Executive Vice President

Former executives

 * Craig L. Fuller was named Senior Vice President for Corporate Affairs at Philip Morris Companies in 1992.
 * Ellen Merlo, Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs. Merlo oversaw programs such as the Accommodation Program, Tort reform efforts, a program to enact preemptive legislation in all 50 U.S. States(PM-drafted legislation to eliminate the ability of voters to enact smoking bans at municipal and county levels)
 * Tina A. Walls, Vice President of State Government Affairs for PM circa 1996
 * Geoffrey C. Bible, President and CEO
 * Michael A. Miles, President and CEO

Contact information
120 Park Ave. New York, NY 10017 Phone: (917) 663-4000 Fax: (917) 663-2167 Web: http://www.altria.com

SourceWatch articles

 * Alexis de Tocqueville Institution
 * ALEC and Tobacco
 * ALEC Boards and Task Forces
 * American Cancer Society
 * American Legislative Exchange Council
 * Animal testing
 * Cato Institute
 * Center for Consumer Freedom
 * Covance Laboratories
 * Frank D. Gomez
 * History of Philip Morris
 * People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
 * Philip Morris Corporate Affairs
 * Philip Morris Worldwide Regulatory Affairs
 * Philip Morris Management Corporation
 * Philip Morris Government Affairs
 * Saudi Arabia
 * Richard Berman cares about animals: clients exposed
 * Smoking beagles
 * Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service
 * Tobacco industry
 * World Health Organization

Internal PM documents

 * Information on how Philip Morris used disinformation is available from pmdocs.com, a webized collection of documents recovered during lawsuits against them.
 * Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, a user-friendly "meta site" from which users can search all the major tobacco industry document databases.

External articles

 * Patricia Reaney, "Philip Morris hid passive smoke data", Reuters, November 11, 2004.
 * Andrew Burrell, "Philip Morris deal sets investment scene alight", Australian Financial Review, March 23, 2005.
 * Jamie Doward and Lea Teuscher, "Tobacco firms' subtle tactics lure smokers to their brand: Philip Morris and other cigarette giants take to subliminal style messages after cigarette advertising is banned," The Observer (UK), September 25, 2005.
 * Barbara Rose, "Philip Morris law firms, supporters backed judge", Chicago Tribune, December 16, 2005.
 * David A. Vise, "Court Overturns $10 Billion Verdict Against Philip Morris", Washington Post, December 16, 2005; Page D02.
 * Patricia Callahan, Jeremy Manier and Delroy Alexander, "Where there's smoke, there might be food research, too: Documents indicate Kraft, Philip Morris shared expertise on how the brain processes tastes, smells", Chicago Tribune, January 29, 2006.
 * Direction for Altria - PM document about name change
 * Andrew Martin, "Wall Street Finds a Lot to Like About Tobacco," New York Times, January 31, 2007.
 * Judith Siers-Poisson, The Politics and PR of Cervical Cancer, a four part series, PRWatch.org, July, 2007.